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Abstract 
We re-examine the negative association between leverage and returns while also focusing on the role of boards 
of directors. To do so, we utilize the unique setting of real estate investment trusts (REITs), their high leverage, 
and the volatility that the industry experienced during the recent financial crisis. We find that during the 
financial crisis REIT board activity increased, especially among firms with high leverage. We also find that board 
activity helps mitigate the previously reported negative effect of leverage on returns during this time period. 
Post-crisis, we find evidence suggesting that firms with more active boards reduce their leverage if their pre-
crisis leverage was high. Further, firms with more active boards have better post-crisis returns. Our findings are 
robust to using different measures of activity that take into account director experience in real estate and 
finance. 
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1. Introduction 
Two areas of corporate finance that have been studied extensively, both theoretically and empirically, 
are capital structure and corporate governance. Additionally, a large number of papers examine how capital 
structure and corporate governance are linked to each other and to firm performance. For example, capital 
structure theory starting with Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggests that increased financial leverage increases 
the risk to equity holders and thus, raises their required rate of return. Other work based on either information 
asymmetry or on agency costs also predicts a positive association between financial leverage and returns 
(e.g. Ross (1977), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), Harris and Raviv (1990), Stulz (1990), and Gomes and Schmid 
(2010)). However, the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. While Bhandari (1988) and Fama and French 
(1992) find a positive relation between leverage and expected returns, Penman et al. (2007), Dimitrov and Jain 
(2008), and George and Hwang (2010) find the opposite. Furthermore, Garlappi et al. (2006) and Korteweg 
(2010) find a non-linear relation between leverage and abnormal returns. 
Agency theory also suggests that debt can act as a self-enforcing mechanism to mitigate conflicts of interest 
between managers and shareholders (e.g. Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), Hart and 
Moore (1995), Williamson (1988), Rajan and Winton (1995), and Stulz (2000)). The intuition is that debt, and 
particularly short-term debt, can reduce discretionary funds, thus subjecting managers to the scrutiny of the 
financial market. Such scrutiny, in turn, reduces managers' self-serving behavior. While emphasizing the use of 
debt as an effective way to mitigate agency problems, agency theory also highlights the importance of board 
monitoring in constraining managerial behavior (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). However, evidence on the 
effectiveness of board structure on firm value is also mixed (e.g. Yermack (1996), Coles et al. (2008), and Adams 
et al. (2010)). 
We re-examine the link between boards of directors, leverage, and firm performance by focusing on board 
activity before and after the 2008 financial crisis. To do so, we use a sample of real estate investment trusts 
(REITs). REITs provide a unique setting to study the association between leverage and firm performance for 
three reasons. First, REITs tend to be highly levered (Barclay et al., 2013; Harrison et al., 2011). Second, REITs 
were heavily impacted by the 2008 financial crisis: the aggregate REIT market capitalization of $438 billion at the 
end of 2006 had declined to $192 billion by the end of 2008, and the National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (NAREIT) Equity REITs Index fell from 10,256.96 in January 2007 to 3337.41 in February 2009, 
a cumulative loss of 67.46%.1 
Third, because of the legal structure under which REITs operate, the need for strong internal governance is not 
obvious. Given that REITs are required to distribute 90% of their taxable income to shareholders, REIT managers 
have limited scope to expropriate (or waste) free cash flow. This attenuates agency problems and limits the 
need for board monitoring. At the same time, however, the top five investors in any REITs together cannot hold 
>50% of the company. This requirement mitigates the effectiveness of external governance by reducing the 
ability of shareholders to take control of the company and change management. As a result, strong boards might 
be needed to prevent managerial entrenchment and agency problems. Taken together, the role of internal 
governance during normal times might not be clear; however, the financial crisis and ensuing volatility for REITs 
allows us to examine the role of boards at a time when they are arguably needed most. 
Empirically, board size and board independence are frequently used as proxies for board monitoring. We 
contribute to the literature by incorporating a focus on board activity through time. A number of prior papers 
focusing on industrial companies have used board meeting frequency to proxy for director effort (e.g. Menon 
and Williams (1994), Vafaes (1999), Deli and Gillan (2000), Brick and Chidambaran (2010), and Nguyen (2014)). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that REIT boards changed their meeting frequency in response to the financial 
crisis. For example, before the financial crisis Redwood Trust Inc.'s board met five times a year and the top 
three committees (Audit, Compensation, and Nomination/Governance) met a total of 16 times a year. During 
the financial crisis, the board met 7.5 times a year while the top three committees met 19 times a year. Post-
crisis, the board met seven times a year and the top three committees met 15 times. We also note that 
Redwood Trust Inc.'s pre-crisis leverage of approximately 92% reduced to approximately 71% post-crisis. 
Using a sample of 222 REITs from 2003 to 2016, we find that REIT boards and board committees meet more 
often during the financial crisis, a result that is driven primarily by larger firms. These findings are consistent 
with director activity changing according to the firm's need for both monitoring and advising from the board. We 
also find evidence of a negative association between leverage and stock returns during the financial crisis and a 
positive association post-crisis, consisted with Sun et al. (2015). However, it appears that board activity 
attenuates the negative association between leverage and returns during the crisis in that returns are not as 
negative for REITs with active boards. Moreover, we find that increased board activity is associated with reduced 
post-crisis leverage, a result driven by the sample of highly levered firms. Specifically, post-crisis, on average, 
firms in the top quartile of leverage reduce their leverage by approximately 8% and a one standard 
deviation change in excess board activity is associated with approximately 1% lower leverage. Lastly, post-crisis 
we find that board activity is positively associated with stock returns. Our results hold after controlling for 
endogeneity and/or using different measures of board activity where we take into account the financial and real 
estate experience of directors. Taken together, our findings suggest that REIT boards of directors add to firm 
value via monitoring and advising with regard to the capital structure decision, especially for highly levered firms 
during a period of financial crisis. 
Our paper contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, we add to the work examining the effect 
of financial leverage on firm performance. Although the association between leverage and firm value has been 
studied extensively, and the theory has provided strong directional predictions as to that relationship, the 
empirical evidence remains mixed. Second, we provide insights into how boards can add value. As suggested 
by Aggarwal et al. (2016), while “…studies generally focus on outcomes that relate to board monitoring, … much 
less is known about the evolution of boardroom practices after regulation, and no study … connects such 
changes to firm value.” We attempt to address this gap in the literature by focusing on how board activity 
changed around the time of the financial crisis - a period during which board input is particularly important. 
Additionally, we explore the link between these changes and firm value. 
Third, we add to the literature on corporate governance in REITs by using board and board committee meetings 
to proxy for board monitoring and advising. Most prior work has emphasized board size and board 
independence as proxies for board strength, or monitoring, but has found little evidence of a connection 
between these proxies and firm performance. Nonetheless, a board that does not meet, or meets rarely, may 
not be effective. By using board and committee meeting frequency for REITs we capture another dynamic of 
board monitoring that has shown to be important in other organizational forms. Furthermore, our newly 
created measure of director activity which incorporates directors' managerial experience in finance and real 
estate allow us to proxy for both the quantity and quality of director activity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the current literature 
and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 reports descriptive statistics, while section 
5 contains our multivariate analyses. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
The classic work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) predicts a positive association between leverage and equity risk 
and returns. Similarly, models based on agency costs (e.g. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), Harris and Raviv (1990), 
and Stulz (1990)) or information asymmetry (Ross, 1977) predict that leverage is positively associated with firm 
value. However, the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, Bhandari (1988) and Fama and French 
(1992) report a positive relationship between market leverage and stock returns. However, Fama and French 
(1992) also find a negative relation between book leverage and stock returns. More recently, Penman et al. 
(2007) document that when decomposing book-to-market equity into an asset component and a leverage 
component, the leverage component is negatively related to stock returns, even after controlling for risk factors 
such as size, estimated beta, return volatility, momentum, and default risk. To explain the negative relation 
between leverage and stock returns, George and Hwang (2010) develop a theoretical model and provide 
empirical evidence showing that this relationship could be explained by distress costs. Specifically, they show 
that since firms with high distress costs choose low leverage, low leverage firms will have the greatest exposure 
to systematic risk related to distress. In the cross section, expected returns will therefore be negatively related 
to leverage. Focusing on product markets, Campello (2006) shows both theoretically and empirically that debt 
could increase or decrease a firm's product market performance: at low debt levels, taking on more debt is 
associated with higher sales; however, at high level of debt, taking on more debt is associated with lower sales. 
Similarly, in real estate, Giacomini et al. (2015) find a positive correlation between leverage and returns 
while Sun et al. (2015) find an inverse relationship. Specifically, using sample of public real estate firms from 
eight countries between 2003 and 2011, Giacomini et al. (2015) find a positive unconditional relation between 
leverage and returns. However, they also find that during the financial crisis, higher leverage is associated with 
larger share price declines. This finding is consistent with Sun et al. (2015) who find that during the years 
surrounding the financial crisis, share prices of REITs with higher debt-to-asset ratios and shorter maturity debt 
fell more. In contrast, Pavlov et al. (2015) find no evidence of a significant relationship between leverage and 
returns for a sample of global real estate securities over the period 1999 to 2011. 
Furthermore, agency theory suggests that debt acts as a self-enforcing mechanism to mitigate agency problems 
(e.g. Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), Hart and Moore (1995), Williamson (1988), Rajan 
and Winton (1995), and Stulz (2000)). More recently, Morellec et al. (2012) develop a dynamic tradeoff model to 
examine the effect of agency conflicts on capital structure. Among other results, they provide evidence that 
external and internal governance mechanisms (including board independence) significantly affect the value of 
control and firms' financing decisions. Empirically, Harford et al. (2008) show that firms with stronger boards use 
more debt and more short-term debt. Similarly, focusing on REITs, Ghosh et al. (2011) report that more 
entrenched CEOs use less debt and shorter maturity debt. In contrast, John and Litov (2010) find that firms with 
entrenched managers use more debt and have higher leverage ratios. Thus, evidence on the link between board 
structure and firm leverage is also conflicting. 
Monitoring managers can also reduce agency problems, and in this regard boards of directors play a central role 
in corporate governance (Jensen, 1993). Indeed, a rich body of theoretical and empirical literature has examined 
board structure including board size and independence (as proxies for board monitoring) and board 
effectiveness (Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010), and Adams et al. (2010)). For 
example, Yermack (1996) reports an association between board size and firm value, suggesting that small boards 
are more effective. In contrast, Coles et al. (2008) find that the relation between board size and firm 
performance is non-linear. Similarly, while independent directors are considered better monitors, inside 
directors can act as a conduit of information to the rest of the board which enhances their ability to monitor and 
advise management (Raheja (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv (2008)). 
Empirically, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black, 1999, Bhagat and Black, 2002 find no evidence 
of an association between board independence and firm performance. In contrast, Coles et al. (2008) find that, 
for complex firms, board independence is positively associated with firm performance, but for R&D-intensive 
firms, the link is negative. More recently, however, Wintoki et al. (2012) conclude that there is no causal relation 
between board structure and firm performance after controlling for endogeneity. Again, the evidence on the 
effectiveness of independent boards is not clear. 
In addition to board size and board independence, board activity is another dimension of director monitoring 
and advising. Among industrial firms, meeting frequency has been used as proxy for board and committee 
activity (Menon and Williams, 1994; Vafaes, 1999; Deli and Gillan, 2000; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Nguyen, 
2014). For example, Vafaes (1999) shows that abnormal board activity improves firm performance, especially 
among those with poor prior performance. Focusing on audit committees, Deli and Gillan (2000) report that 
firms' demand for independent and active audit committee is driven by the demand for accounting 
certification. Brick and Chidambaran (2010) find that board monitoring activity (as proxied by the number of 
board and committee meetings and by the independence of Audit, Compensation and Nominating committees) 
is positively associated with a firm's industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. Thus, we use board and committee meetings as 
proxies for board activity while taking into account director experience and controlling for board size and 
independence. 
As mentioned earlier, we choose to focus on REITs in testing our hypotheses because REITs are highly levered 
and leverage amplifies REIT returns in both a positive and negative direction (Giacomini et al., 2015; Sun et al., 
2015). Moreover, because of the dividend payout requirement and the restrictions on ownership concentration, 
the role of internal governance in REITs is not clear. Nevertheless, the evidence to date suggests that REITs 
boards do matter. For example, Friday and Sirmans (1998) and Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) show that there is a 
positive association between board independence and firm value. In addition, Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) show 
that firms with weak director monitoring (large boards and boards with older and busier directors) pay their 
CEOs more. Hartzell et al. (2008) find that firms with better governance structure at the time of IPO not only 
have higher initial valuations but also better long-term performance than their counterparts. More 
recently, Anglin et al. (2012) report that good corporate governance is essential for constraining earnings 
management, especially for a subset of REITs that are more susceptible to such activities. As a result, focusing on 
REITs between 2003 and 2016, a period spanning the financial crisis, provides an ideal setting to observe both 
the effect of leverage and the role of the boards in affecting firm performance. 
In addition to the impact on market value and volatility, the financial crisis led to many changes in the regulatory 
environment. As consequence, firms and their boards were under intense scrutiny, and this has continued post-
crisis. This is especially true for REITs. Consistent with prior literature, we argue that during the financial crisis, 
the performance of REITs with high leverage will be more negative. However, this is also the time when internal 
governance, specifically the board, will act to monitor and advise management. As such, we also anticipate that 
director activity increases and has the potential to attenuate the negative effect of leverage on performance. 
H1a 
During the financial crisis, boards at firms with high leverage increase their activity. 
H1b 
Active boards mitigate the negative effects of leverage on returns during the financial crisis. 
In the post crisis period, we would expect boards to learn from their experience during the crisis and potentially 
adjust the firm's capital structure. Indeed, in related work, Pavlov et al. (2018) report that some REITs mitigated 
risk prior to the crisis by reducing leverage and extending their debt maturity. This, in turn, was associated with 
better performance during the crisis. We build on these insights and argue that, conditioned on performance 
and board activity during the crisis, RIETs with high leverage will lower debt levels post-crisis. 
H2 
Post-crisis, firm with high leverage and more active boards will lower their leverage to reduce leverage risk. 
Sun et al. (2015) find that post-crisis, leverage is positively associated with firm performance. The positive 
association between leverage and returns is consistent with theoretical predictions (e.g. Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), Ross (1977), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), Harris and Raviv (1990), Stulz (1990) and Gomes and Schmid 
(2010)) and prior empirical evidence (e.g. Bhandari (1988), Fama and French (1992), and Giacomini et al. (2015)). 
We argue that boards add value not only during the crisis period, but also more generally at other times. Thus, 
focusing on the post-crisis period, we hypothesize that the positive link between leverage and returns is partly 
driven by board monitoring and advising (and thus board activity). 
H3 
Firms with higher leverage and more active boards have higher returns post-crisis. 
A potential concern when examining the effect of governance on firm value is endogeneity (e.g. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) and Adams et al. (2010)). To address the issue of endogeneity between director activity and 
firm value, following Nguyen, 2014, we use two-stage OLS regression models. In the first stage, we use the 
lagged median number of board (or committee) meetings of REITs that invest in the same property type 
as instrumental variables. The rationale is that directors would not want to appear less diligent than directors of 
peer firms by having fewer meetings, but they do not want to meet too often because meetings are costly for 
them. Thus, industry norms should dictate how many meetings a firm would have. However, how often the 
boards and committees of similar firms meet should not affect the performance of a particular firm. 
3. Data 
We start with a sample of 275 unique REITs operating between 2003 and 2016 from the Ziman REIT database on 
the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). We merge the REIT sample with CRSP and Compustat 
databases to obtain stock returns and financial information. The number of board and committee meetings and 
board characteristics are obtained from MyLogIQ and Morningstar. We hand-collect any missing board data 
from proxy statements. The final sample includes 1701 observations (222 unique REITs) from 2003 to 2016. 
Moreover, to make our findings more comparable to those from prior work, we use a sub-sample similar to that 
of Sun et al. (2015). This sub-sample includes 137 REITs that operate between 2006 and 2011. See Appendix 
1 for more details about sample construction. 
Following the prior literature (e.g. Menon and Williams (1994) and Vafaes (1999)), we use meeting frequency as 
a proxy for director activity. It is argued that board and committees that meet more often are better monitors 
(and advisors) as they put more effort into performing their duties. We focus on the board as a whole and the 
three committees whose main function is to monitor management: the Audit, the Compensation and the 
Nominating/Governance committees. Specifically, Board Meetings is the number of board meetings during a 
fiscal year while Committee Meetings is the number of meeting held by all three monitoring committees during 
a fiscal year (Nguyen, 2014). In addition, we measure Abnormal Board (Committee) Meetings as the difference 
between the number of board (committee) meetings and the average board (committee) meetings during the 
pre-crisis period (i.e. from 2003 to 2006), similar in spirit to the approach of Vafaes (1999). Meeting frequency 
per se does not necessarily reflect the quality of director monitoring and/or advising and therefore, may not 
help the REIT's performance. Thus, we control for director experience in real estate and finance as this type of 
experience could be valuable for the firms, especially during the financial crisis. Specifically, we hand-collect 
director biographic information from the company proxy statements, Bloomberg and Linkedin to estimate the 
number of years a particular director has managerial experience in finance and/or real estate as a proxy for his 
and/or her finance or real estate experience, respectively. We then average the finance or real estate 
experience across the whole board to construct three variables FIN Experience, RE Experience, and FIN & RE 
Experience respectively. Finally, we create “experience weighted” measures of director activity as the product of 
the number of meetings and director experience as it is plausible that both the experience of the directors and 
the time they spend on monitoring and advising are important.2 We also include other more commonly-used 
proxies for the quality of board monitoring: Board Size (the total number of directors on the board) and Board 
Independence (the proportion of independent directors on the board). 
We measure returns during financial crisis as the cumulative monthly return for each REIT from January 2007 to 
February 2009 (Cumulative Return 2007–2009). Post-crisis return is measured as the cumulative monthly return 
from March 2009 to December 2016 (Cumulative Return 2009–2016). As proxies for leverage, we use Market 
Leverage, the ratio of total debt to market value of the firm. Total debt is calculated as the book value of debt 
due in one year and long-term debt while market value of the firm is calculated as total debt plus book value of 
preferred stock plus equity market capitalization. We also use an indicator, High Leverage, that equals one if the 
firm's leverage is on the top quartile of the sample and zero otherwise. 
We control for other firm characteristics that have been shown by prior literature to affect firm's governance, 
leverage, and returns. For example, we include Firm Size, Tobin's Q, FFO per Share, Variable Rate Debt/Total 
Debt, Debt Due in 1 year/Total Debt and Debt Due in 2 or 3 years/Total Debt (Sun et al., 2015). In addition, we 
control for different property types.3 See Appendix 2 for a more detailed description of the variables included in 
the study. 
Table 1, Panel A, provides summary statistics for the full sample. The average board has eight members with 
approximately 73% classified as independent directors. These numbers are similar to those reported in other 
studies (e.g. Ghosh and Sirmans (2005), Anglin et al. (2012), and Hartzell et al. (2014)). On average, boards meet 
eight times per year and the Audit, Compensation, and Nomination/Governance committees meet 14 times. The 
number of board meetings is similar to that of other studies for both REIT and non-REIT firms (e.g. Anglin et al. 
(2012) and Nguyen (2014)).4 On average, directors have nine (ten) years of managerial experience in finance 
(real estate). With respect to firm characteristics, the average firm has total assets of $5.4B, a Tobin's Q of 1.31, 
and a leverage of 43%. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Panel A: full sample     
This table reports summary statistics for our sample of 222 unique 
REITs from 2003 to 2016. See Appendix 2 for variable definitions. 
    
Variable N Mean Median Std 
Dev 
Board size 1701 8.09 8.00 2.21 
Board independence 1701 72.70 71.43 11.75 
Board meetings 1701 8.30 7.00 4.56 
Committee meetings 1701 14.34 14.00 5.60 
FIN experience 1698 9.11 8.14 6.24 
RE experience 1698 10.07 9.55 6.79 
Total assets (B$) 1701 5.43 2.55 10.32 
Firm Q 1665 1.31 1.22 0.43 
Firm age 1701 26.00 20.00 19.66 
Leverage 1697 43.48 45.97 21.35 
UPREIT 1694 0.65 1.00 0.48 
Maryland 1701 0.76 1.00 0.43 
Panel B: 2006 sub-
sample. 
        
This table reports the 
summary statistics for 
the sub-sample of 
137 REITs that were 
traded in 2006. 
See Appendix 2 for 
variable definitions. 
        
Variable N Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl 25th 
Pctl 
50th Pctl 75th Pctl 95th Pctl 
Cumulative return 
1/2007–12/2011 
137 −0.119 0.551 −0.892 −0.559 −0.207 0.273 0.924 
Cumulative return 
1/2007–2/2009 
137 −0.602 0.288 −0.964 −0.822 −0.659 −0.466 −0.070 
Cumulative return 
3/2009–12/2011 
137 1.894 1.837 −0.148 0.732 1.356 2.603 5.757 
Cumulative return 
3/2009–12/2016 
137 4.486 4.014 −0.216 1.734 3.635 5.560 13.998 
Total assets 137 3916.920 5113.330 115.740 955.317 2016.130 4632.230 15,062.220 
Firm size 137 14.380 1.522 11.659 13.770 14.517 15.349 16.528 
Firm Q 137 1.466 0.476 0.991 1.153 1.379 1.647 2.221 
Cash/total assets 137 0.044 0.074 0.001 0.008 0.022 0.045 0.173 
FFO per share 98 2.924 4.220 0.887 1.540 2.375 3.580 5.130 
Market leverage 137 0.406 0.194 0.054 0.298 0.405 0.526 0.746 
Preferred stock 137 0.031 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.144 
Variable rate 
debt/total debt 
137 0.121 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.184 0.515 
Debt due in 
1 year/total debt 
134 0.125 0.237 0.000 0.005 0.036 0.101 0.841 
Debt due in 2–
3 year/total debt 
134 0.204 0.242 0.000 0.042 0.131 0.239 0.859 
Board meetings 132 8.076 3.775 4.000 5.000 7.000 10.000 16.000 
Audit meetings 132 7.227 3.005 4.000 5.000 7.000 9.000 12.000 
Comp. meeting 132 4.417 2.815 1.000 3.000 4.000 6.000 10.000 
Gov. & nom meetings 132 2.492 1.763 0.000 1.000 2.000 4.000 6.000 
FIN experience 134 7.454 5.459 0.000 3.900 6.690 9.889 18.333 
RE experience 134 9.418 6.113 0.000 4.778 9.091 12.333 21.857 
 
For comparison purposes, Panel B, Table 1, provides summary statistics for the sub-sample similar to the one 
in Sun et al. (2015). The average return during the financial crisis is −60% and post-crisis is 189%. On average, the 
market leverage is 40%, 12% of the total debt is due in one year, and another 20% of total debt is due in the next 
two years. Except for the number of meetings and director experience, which are not included in Sun et al. 
(2015), the other variables are comparable. 
Table 2 reports the correlations between our main variables of the subsample. Firm size is negatively associated 
with returns during the crisis but positively associated with post-crisis returns. In contrast, Tobin's Q is positively 
associated with returns during the crisis, but post-crisis that relationship is reversed. In addition, during the 
crisis, market leverage is negatively associated with returns; post-crisis, market leverage is positively associated 
with returns. This finding is consistent with leverage amplifying REIT returns in both a positive and negative 
direction (Giacomini et al. (2015) and Sun et al. (2015)). 
  
Table 2. Correlation matrix.  
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
[1] Cumulative return 
1/2007–2/2009 
              
                
[2] Cumulative return  −0.50  
3/2009–12/2016 <0.0001 
             
[3] Size −0.23 0.29 
            
  
0.01 0.00 
            
[4] Firm Q 0.14 −0.16 −0.11 
           
  
0.09 0.07 0.22 
           
[5] Cash/total assets −0.05 −0.07 −0.22 0.26 
          
  
0.55 0.41 0.01 0.00 
          
[6] FFO per share −0.02 −0.10 0.45 0.32 0.05 
         
  
0.84 0.31 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.63 
         
[7] Market leverage −0.38 0.31 0.20 −0.54 −0.10 −0.03 
        
  
<0.0001 0.00 0.02 <0.0001 0.25 0.76 
        
[8] Preferred stock 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.12 −0.08 −0.05 −0.26 
       
  
0.17 0.92 0.48 0.16 0.35 0.62 0.00 
       
[9] Variable rate debt/total 
debt 
−0.11 0.02 −0.07 0.17 −0.18 0.08 −0.14 0.03       
  0.18 0.79 0.40 0.04 0.03 0.45 0.11 0.74       
[10] Debt due in 1 year/total 
debt 
0.15 −0.05 0.04 −0.34 0.19 −0.01 −0.03 −0.10 −0.22 
     
  
0.09 0.60 0.67 <0.0001 0.02 0.89 0.73 0.23 0.01 
     
[11] Debt due in 2–
3 year/total debt 
0.20 −0.12 −0.04 −0.29 0.16 −0.09 −0.07 0.00 −0.16 0.90 
    
  
0.02 0.15 0.68 0.00 0.07 0.38 0.39 0.97 0.07 <0.0001 
    
[12] Board meetings −0.02 0.06 0.18 −0.09 −0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 −0.10 −0.08 −0.13 
   
 
 0.82 0.47 0.04 0.31 0.73 0.89 0.91 0.85 0.25 0.36 0.14 
   
[13] Committee meetings −0.08 0.12 0.34 0.11 −0.05 −0.15 0.08 0.04 −0.10 −0.21 −0.22 0.28 
  
  
0.37 0.16 0.00 0.21 0.57 0.14 0.36 0.64 0.27 0.02 0.01 <0.0001 
  




0.62 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.46 0.00 0.83 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.63 0.39 
 
[15] RE experience −0.10 0.02 −0.07 0.35 0.05 −0.05 −0.17 −0.06 0.30 −0.22 −0.17 −0.17 0.06 −0.54 
  0.27 0.83 0.43 <0.0001 0.56 0.61 0.05 0.49 <0.0001 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.48 <0.0001 
  
4. Univariate results 
Prior literature has shown that director monitoring and advising changes depending on a firm's need for board 
oversight (Linck et al. (2009) and Linn and Park (2005)). As firm size is often used to capture firm complexity and, 
thus the demand for director monitoring and advising, we partition our sample firms into three groups based on 
their total assets. Specifically, large firms are those in the top tercile while small firms are those in the bottom 
tercile. In addition, we argue that the demand for board monitoring will change through time. Thus, we divide 
our sample period into three sub-periods: Pre-crisis, Crisis, and Post-crisis. Pre-crisis is defined to be before 2007 
while Post-crisis is from 2009 forward. In Table 3, we report the distribution of the main variables across firm 
size and time periods for the full sample. 
  
Table 3. Board characteristics, board and committee activity, leverage and firm performance based on firm size and periods. 
This table reports board structure, board and committee activity, leverage and firm performance. Firms are partitioned into terciles based on 
their total assets. Firms in each tercile are partitioned into three periods: the pre-crisis period is from 2003 to 2006, the crisis period is from 2007 
to 2008, and the post-crisis period is from 2009 to 2016. For each size-period group, we report the average value of each variable in the 




















Large Pre-crisis 163 9.20 70.87 8.06 7.88 5.07 3.36 0.46 26.04  
Crisis 91 8.88 71.25 10.11 7.80 5.85 3.14 0.60 −34.03  
Post-
crisis 




0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.57 0.00 0.00 
Medium Pre-crisis 225 8.47 71.17 8.54 7.65 4.34 2.84 0.43 25.24  
Crisis 105 8.50 71.10 8.70 6.94 5.09 3.13 0.55 −28.96  
Post-
crisis 




0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Small Pre-crisis 268 7.08 67.50 7.31 6.15 2.82 1.59 0.40 22.74  
Crisis 100 6.93 67.97 8.10 6.50 3.05 2.20 0.53 −30.34  
Post-
crisis 




0.14 0.25 0.01 0.11 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
  
Across all firm size categories, we find that there are changes in board structure pre- and post-crisis. While large- 
and medium-sized firms seem to reduce their board size post-crisis, small firms increase their board size slightly. 
In addition, all firms increase board independence after 2008. This is consistent with the focus on board 
independence by regulators and proponents of good governance around this time. Focusing on board and 
committee activity, we find that boards of larger firms met more often during the crisis. For example, during the 
crisis, on average, boards of large firms had two more meetings than the pre-crisis average (a 25% increase). 
Post-crisis, the number of board meetings decreased compared to the crisis period, but remained higher than 
the number of pre-crisis meetings (12.5% more than pre-crisis period). For small firms, meeting frequency 
increased for both the board and committees during the financial crisis, but the pattern post-crisis is not clear. In 
addition, for medium firms and the audit and nominating/governance committees of larger firms, meeting 
frequency did not seem to change significantly during crisis, but tends to decline post-crisis. A potential 
explanation for the differences in director activity patterns for large versus small and medium firms is that large 
firms are more complex and more difficult to monitor which requires more director effort, especially during 
difficult times. In addition, larger firms are exposed to more external pressures than other firms (e.g., 
institutional shareholders, media, regulators, etc.) thus directors might want to demonstrate that they are doing 
their job by meeting more often. 
With regard to leverage, across all periods, firm size is positively associated with leverage. This is consistent with 
larger firms having higher debt capacity and borrowing more (e.g. Harrison et al. (2011)). In addition, across all 
firm size groups, leverage increases during the financial crisis (primarily because of a declining market value of 
equity) but decreases again in the post-crisis period. We also observe that post-crisis leverage is lower than pre-
crisis leverage, especially for larger firms. A similar pattern is observed with annual stock returns: Across all firm 
size groups, returns decrease during the financial crisis but bounce back post-crisis, albeit remaining at a lower 
level post-crisis relative to the pre-crisis period. 
Overall, the univariate results indicate that board structure and activity vary with firm characteristics. Moreover, 
board independence increases through time, and boards are more active during the financial crisis, especially at 
large firms. These findings are consistent with director activity changing depending on firms' demand for 
monitoring and advising. In the next section, we examine the association between director activity, leverage, 
and firm performance in the multivariate setting. 
5. Multivariate results 
5.1. Director activity, leverage and firm performance during the financial crisis 
As mentioned earlier, to facilitate the comparison of our findings with those from prior work we focus our 
analysis on the subsample that is comparable to Sun et al. (2015). We first examine board and committee 
meeting frequency during the financial crisis. We argue that during this period, the stock price is more 
volatile, leverage has a more negative effect on returns, and therefore firms have a higher demand for director 
monitoring and advising. As a result, boards at firms with high leverage will increase their activity (H1a). 
Table 4 Panel A reports the results for board activity, while Panel B reports the results for committee activity. To 
proxy for increased board and committee activity during the financial crisis, we use the sum of the abnormal 
board (or committee) meetings during 2007 and 2008. The abnormal meetings are measured in a manner 
similar to Vafaes (1999) as the number of meetings above the normal level (where the normal level is measured 
as the average number of meetings from 2003 to 2006). The explanatory variables we use in the base 
specification, Model 1, are similar to those in Sun et al. (2015) and are measured at the end of 2006. In Model 2, 
we add several board characteristics including ln(Board Size), Board Independence, FIN Experience, and RE 
Experience. 
Table 4. Board and committee activity during the financial crisis. 
This table models board activity (Panel A) and committee activity (Panel B) during the financial crisis. 
The dependent variable, Abnormal Board (Committee) Meetings during the financial crisis is measured 
as the difference between the number of board (committee) meetings during 2007 and 2008 and the 
average number of board (committee) meetings from 2003 to 2006 (i.e. the pre-crisis 
period). Market Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (the book value of debt due in one year 
plus long-term debt) to the market value of the firm (total debt plus book value of preferred stock plus 
market capitalization). High Leverage is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm's leverage is in 
the top quartile and zero otherwise (see Appendix 2 for other variable definitions). Explanatory variables 
are measured at the end of 2006 and are standardized at the mean and have unit variance. P-values are 
reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in 
two-tailed tests. 
Variable Panel A: abnormal 
board meetings 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 5.2759** 5.4452** 3.2681 3.8799 11.4658*** 10.8086***  
[0.025] [0.022] [0.198] [0.127] [0.001] [0.004] 

















Ln(total assets) 1.1469 1.4366 1.4052 1.7359* 2.5984* 2.8956*  
[0.205] [0.154] [0.119] [0.084] [0.078] [0.051] 
Firm Q 0.5689 0.9139 0.2697 0.3698 1.6982 0.2775  
[0.638] [0.460] [0.790] [0.724] [0.34] [0.857] 
FFO per share 0.2439 0.2893 0.3181 0.3635 −0.2383 −0.2096  
[0.671] [0.610] [0.579] [0.524] [0.773] [0.803] 
Cash/total assets 0.8965 −0.0229 0.5576 −0.2558 1.6814 1.3401  
[0.50] [0.986] [0.676] [0.853] [0.40] [0.510] 
Variable rate 
debt/total debt 
0.2684 0.0518 0.0704 −0.1109 0.7051 0.5666 
 
[0.65] [0.933] [0.907] [0.859] [0.440] [0.538] 
Debt due in 
1 year/total debt 
1.5950 3.6357 1.2660 3.4036 6.7801 6.8406 
 
[0.667] [0.331] [0.732] [0.364] [0.214] [0.217] 
Debt due in 2–
3 year/total debt 
−0.5246 −1.4703 −0.7020 −1.5327 −0.1578 −0.2640 
 





−1.2473* −1.8174* −1.9900*   
[0.077] 
 





−1.3826** −2.1545** −2.0899**   
[0.031] 
 





0.7496 −2.0579 −2.1744   
[0.32] 
 





−0.2773 −0.5846 −0.4741   
[0.792] 
 
[0.729] [0.613] [0.688] 
REIT types Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num of obs 92 91 92 91 91 91 
R-square 0.1877 0.2939 0.2000 0.2906 0.2201 0.2012 
Models 3 and 4 are similar to Models 1 and 2 except that in place of Market Leverage, we use an indicator 
variable (High Leverage) to capture highly levered firms, specifically, those whose market leverage is in the 
top quartile. The rationale is that firms with higher leverage will be affected more during the financial crisis than 
other firms, and thus the demand for board monitoring and advising will be higher. Models 5 and 6 are similar to 
Models 2 and 4, respectively, except that the dependent variable is Abnormal Committee Meetings. All 
models include indicator variables for different REIT types. For this and subsequent tests, we standardize all 
continuous variables so that they have zero mean and unit variance. Thus, the coefficient estimates reported 
correspond to a one standard deviation change in the continuous explanatory variables, or a change from 
zero to one for indicator variables. 
In Table 4 Models 1 and 2 we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, Market Leverage is positively 
associated with board activity during the financial crisis. In terms of economic magnitude, a one-standard-
deviation increase in leverage is associated with approximately two additional board meetings. This is not only 
statistically significant, but also economically meaningful given the unconditional number of board meetings is 
eight. In addition, in Model 2, Board Size and Board Independence are both negatively associated with 
abnormal board meetings. This finding is consistent with the argument that it is harder to coordinate larger 
boards and those with more non-employee directors thus these firms have fewer excess meetings. However, 
neither experience variables (FIN Experience and RE Experience) are significantly associated with excess 
director activity. When we use the indicator variable High Leverage, we see that firms with leverage in the 
top quartile have three additional meetings compared to other firms. This is statistically significant at 4% and 
11% levels (Models 3 and 4, respectively). These findings are consistent with the univariate results and with our 
hypothesis that during the crisis, boards of highly levered firms increase their activity to meet the increased 
demand for monitoring and advising. 
In an attempt to separate the monitoring and advising functions, in Panel B (Models 5 and 6) we focus on the 
activity of the three monitoring committees. Neither Market Leverage nor High Leverage is significantly 
associated with abnormal monitoring committee meetings, suggesting that these key committees of highly 
levered firms did not increase their monitoring activity during the financial crisis more than other firms. Taken 
together with the results from Panel A, it would seem that during the financial crisis directors of high levered 
firms increased their activity via board meetings as a whole rather than via committee meetings. 
Next, we examine the effect of leverage on stock returns from January 2007 to February 2009 (Cumulative 
Return 2007–2009). This captures the heart of the financial crisis period. Panel A report the results from OLS 
regression, of which Models 1 and 2 we use Market Leverage while in Models 3 and 4 we use the High 
Leverage. In Panel B, we include FIN & RE experience-weighted abnormal board activity during the financial 
crisis, board size, and board independence. As noted in the previous section, a potential concern we face when 
examining the effect of governance on firm value is endogeneity (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003) and Adams et al. (2010)). Thus, we use two-stage OLS regression models to address the potential 
endogeneity between director activity and firm value. Following Nguyen (2014), our instrumental 
variable in the first stage is the lagged median number of board (or committee) meetings by REIT property 
type. We report the coefficients from the second stage regressions (Models 5 to 8) in Table 5. 
  
Table 5. Director activities, leverage and firm performance during the financial crisis. 
This table reports the association between board activity, leverage, and firm performance during the financial crisis. The dependent variable is 
cumulative monthly stock returns between January 2007 and February 2009 (Cumulative Return 2007–2009). Market Leverage is defined as the 
ratio of total debt (the book value of debt due in one year plus long-term debt) to the market value of the firm (total debt plus book value of 
preferred stock plus market capitalization). High Leverage is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm's leverage is in the top quartile and 
zero otherwise. Exp. Weighted Abnormal Board Meetings during the financial crisis is measured as the product of FIN& RE 
Experience and Abnormal Board Meetings during the financial crisis where FIN& RE Experience is measured as the average across the whole 
board number of years of managerial experience in finance or real estate (see Appendix 2 for other variable definitions). Explanatory variables 
are measured at the end of 2006 and are standardized at the mean and have unit variance. Panel A reports the results from OLS regressions. 
Panel B reports the results from the second stage regressions. The instrumental variable used in the first stage is the lagged median property 
type number of board meetings. P-values are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Variable Panel A: OLS    Panel B: 2SLS     
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept −0.6365*** −0.6912*** −0.5697*** −0.6208*** −0.6863*** −0.7012*** −0.6509*** −0.6516***  
[<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] 

















Exp. weighted ab. board meetings during crisis 
    
−0.0155 −0.0136 −0.0173 −0.0168      
[0.233] [0.356] [0.192] [0.288] 
Ln(total assets) −0.0823** −0.0746** −0.094*** −0.085*** −0.0565 −0.0236 −0.0588 −0.0239  
[0.010] [0.017] [0.004] [0.007] [0.146] [0.704] [0.167] [0.724] 
Firm Q 0.0142* 0.0218 0.047 0.0516 0.0293 0.0103 0.0524 0.0442  
[0.737] [0.597] [0.195] [0.146] [0.528] [0.822] [0.198] [0.278] 
FFO per share −0.0074 −0.0014 −0.0096 −0.0035 0.0054 0.0124 0.0072 0.0142  
[0.714] [0.942] [0.63] [0.859] [0.808] [0.603] [0.759] [0.586] 
Cash/total assets 0.0076 0.0084 0.0256 0.0242 0.0096 −0.0039 0.0158 0.0035  
[0.87] [0.855] [0.590] [0.60] [0.858] [0.940] [0.774] [0.949] 
Variable rate debt/total debt −0.0374* −0.0429** −0.0304 −0.0355* −0.0263 −0.0401* −0.0231 −0.0342  
[0.078] [0.04] [0.157] [0.096] [0.321] [0.088] [0.363] [0.160] 




−0.3104** −0.2828* −0.2478 −0.2893** −0.2413   
[0.014] 
 
[0.017] [0.050] [0.101] [0.049] [0.121] 




0.1187** 0.0904 0.0852 0.0954 0.0858   
[0.027] 
 
[0.018] [0.124] [0.205] [0.117] [0.229] 
Ln(board size) 
     
−0.0598 
 





     
−0.0057 
 




REIT types Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num of obs 93 93 93 93 88 88 88 88 
R-square 0.412 0.4625 0.4002 0.4527 0.43768 0.47108 0.41998 0.43858 
 
  
We find that in Panel A, leverage is negatively associated with stock returns during the financial crisis. 
Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in Market Leverage is associated with a decrease in cumulative 
stock return of about 10% during the financial crisis (Model 1), which is consistent with Sun et al. (2015). In 
addition, the proportion of variable interest rate debt and debt due in one year is negatively associated with 
crisis period returns. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of variable interest rate 
debt is associated with a decrease in Cumulative Return 2007–2009 of approximately 5% (Model 2). Similarly, in 
Models 3 and 4, the coefficient of High Leverage is negative and significant, suggesting that highly levered firms 
perform worse than other firms during the financial crisis. In particular, during the crisis, highly levered firms 
underperform other firms by approximately 12%, significant at the 5% level (Model 3). 
However, in Panel B, after controlling for board structure and activity and potential endogeneity, the coefficients 
on Market Leverage (Models 5 and 6) and High Leverage (Models 7 and 8) are no longer significantly associated 
with stock returns during the crisis. Additionally, the significance of variables proxying for debt structure and 
maturity also decreases. While a “non-result,” this finding is consistent with our hypothesis that board and 
committee activities during the financial crisis help attenuate the negative effects of leverage on 
returns.5 Overall, the findings in Table 4, Table 5 are consistent with the hypothesis that boards and committees 
increase their activity during the financial crisis in response to the increased monitoring and advising needs of 
the firm. In addition, board activity appears to attenuate the negative effects of leverage on returns during the 
financial crisis. 
5.2. Director monitoring, leverage and firm performance post financial crisis 
In this section, we first examine the effect of board activity on leverage in the post-crisis period. We anticipate 
that boards learn from their experience and, conditioned on performance during the crisis, REITs with high 
leverage will lower debt levels post-crisis (H2). To test this hypothesis, we start with our full sample of REITs and 
focus on those that are traded in 2006. We do this for two reasons. First, to have measures of leverage and 
accounting variables at the end of 2006, prior to the crisis level. Second, this approach closely mirrors that 
of Sun et al. (2015) and thus allows us to compare our findings with theirs. We then track these firms up to 2016. 
We rank REITs into quartiles based on their leverage as of the end of 2006. We then calculate the average of 
leverage, change in leverage, board activity, and change in board activity post-crisis. The results are report 
in Table 6. The last two rows report the difference between the highest and lowest quartiles based on 2006 
leverage along with P-values as to whether the difference is different from zero. 
Table 6. Board activity and leverage post-crisis. 
 
This table reports the change in leverage and board activity from 2009 to 2016. Firms are partitioned 
into quartiles based on their leverage at the end of 2006. Market Leverage is defined as the ratio of total 
debt (the book value of debt due in one year and long-term debt) to market value of the firm (total debt 
plus book value of preferred stock plus market capitalization). Board Meetings is the number of board 
meetings in a particular year. Change in Market Leverage (Change in Board Meetings) is calculated as 
the difference between Market Leverage (Board Meetings) in a particular year post-crisis and the 
2006 Market Leverage (Board Meetings). P-values for tests of the difference between high- and low-
leverage firms are reported in brackets. 












Change in board 
meetings 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
4 high 277 0.5861 −0.0809 8.7040 9.5885 0.8845 
3 289 0.4912 0.0342 8.0138 8.4706 0.4568 
2 311 0.3729 0.0189 8.2251 7.3794 −0.8457 
1 low 281 0.2620 0.1000 8.6121 7.9182 −0.6940 
High - low 
 
0.3240 −0.1808 0.0919 1.6703 1.5784 
P-value 
 
[<0.0001] [<0.0001] [0.7965] [<0.0001] [0.0003] 
 
Table 6, column 3 shows that after the financial crisis, on average, firms with high pre-crisis leverage are still 
more levered than those with low pre-crisis leverage; however, the gap between high- and low-levered groups is 
smaller. Specifically, column 4 suggests that while firms with high pre-crisis leverage reduce their leverage post-
crisis, other firms increase their leverage. Specifically, firms in the top quartile of leverage reduce their leverage 
by approximately 8% post-crisis, while firms in the bottom quartile of leverage increase their leverage by 10% 
post-crisis. The difference-in-difference change in leverage between firms in the top and bottom quartiles is 18% 
and significant at the 1% level. 
In terms of board meetings, column 5 shows that pre-crisis, there is no significant difference in board meetings 
between the lowest and highest leverage quartiles. However, after the financial crisis, we observe a significant 
change in board meetings: boards of the higher leverage firms increase their activity whereas boards of the 
lower leverage firms decrease their activity (column 6). In particular, boards of the highest leverage group had 
an average of 0.88 additional meetings per year, while there is a decline of 0.69 meetings per year for boards in 
the lowest leverage group. The difference-in-difference of 1.68 meetings is significant at the 1% level. In 
summary, the results in Table 6 indicate that boards change their activity and firm leverage after the financial 
crisis conditioned on the pre-crisis leverage. Moreover, it seems that highly levered firms reduce their leverage 
significantly after the financial crisis. 
To further explore the findings in Table 6 we turn to a multivariate analysis. Our dependent variable is Change in 
Leverage which, again, is measured as the difference between the current leverage and pre-crisis leverage (i.e. 
leverage as of 2006). The explanatory variables include Abnormal Board Meetings, Experience-weighted 
Abnormal Board Meetings, RE Experience-weighted Abnormal Board Meetings, FIN Experience-weighted 
Abnormal Board Meetings, cumulative stock return during the financial crisis (Cumulative Return 2007–2009), 
and other accounting variables as before. In addition, in Models 6–8, we include an indicator variable Negative 
Leverage which takes a value of one if in 2006 the firm's return (EBITDA / (Equity Market Capitalization + Book 
Value of Debt)) is less than its average cost of debt, and zero otherwise. Except for Cumulative Return 2007–
2009 and Negative Leverage, other variables are lagged one year. The results are reported in Table 7. Models 1–
6 are for the full sample. Model 7 is for REITs in the highest pre-crisis leverage quartile, and Model 8 for REITs in 
the lowest pre-crisis leverage quartile. 
  
Table 7. Board activity and leverage post-crisis. 
This table models the change in leverage from 2009 to 2016. The dependent variable is Change in Leverage which is measured as the difference 
between market leverage at the end of a fiscal year between 2009 and 2016 and the 2006 market leverage. Abnormal Board Meetings is 
measured as the difference between the number of board meetings in a particular year and the average number of board meetings from 2003 
to 2006 (i.e. the pre-crisis period). Exp. Weighted Abnormal Board Meetings, RE Exp. Weighted Abnormal Board Meetings, and FIN 
Exp. Weighted Abnormal Board Meetings are calculated as the product of Abnormal Board Meetings and FIN&RE Experience, RE Experience, 
and FIN Experience, respectively. Negative Leverage is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm's return calculated as 
EBITA / (Equity Market Capitalization + Book Value of Debt) is less than its weighted average cost of debt (see Appendix 2 for other variable 
definitions). Explanatory variables are measured at the end of the previous year and are standardized at the mean and have unit variance. 
Models 1–6 report the results from the full sample while Models 7 (Model 8) report the results from sub-samples of firms for which the 2006 
leverage is in the top (bottom) quartile. P-values are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 0.0332* 0.0477** 0.0477** 0.0473** 0.0473** 0.0487** 0.0023 0.1765***  
[0.071] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.024] [0.977] [<0.0001] 
Ab. board meetings 
 
−0.0073* 
      
  
[0.094] 
      
Exp. weighted ab. board meetings 
  
−0.0010** 
     
   
[0.018] 
     
RE exp. weighted ab. board meetings 
   
−0.0002 
    
    
[0.437] 
    
FIN exp. weighted ab. board meetings 
    
−0.0017*** −0.0019*** −0.0054** −0.0014**      
[0.000] [0.000] [0.014] [0.043] 
Negative leverage 
     
−0.0238** 0.0750 −0.0914***       
[0.028] [0.101] [0.009] 
Cumulative return 1/2007–2/2009 0.0050 0.0097 0.0095 0.0092 0.0092 0.0131 −0.0011 0.0454**  
[0.53] [0.292] [0.301] [0.31] [0.309] [0.171] [0.95] [0.03] 
Ln(total assets) −0.0323*** −0.0189** −0.0190** −0.0195** −0.0175** −0.0011 0.1601** 0.0233  
[<0.0001] [0.032] [0.0] [0.027] [0.044] [0.921] [0.018] [0.242] 
Firm Q −0.0137** −0.0161** −0.0157** −0.0163** −0.0143** −0.0153* 0.1226* −0.0051  
[0.035] [0.022] [0.025] [0.02] [0.040] [0.062] [0.080] [0.595] 
Cash/total assets −0.0258* −0.0336* −0.0343* −0.0337* −0.0330* −0.0327 −0.1144 −0.0362*  
[0.076] [0.081] [0.07] [0.080] [0.082] [0.129] [0.160] [0.083] 
Market leverage 0.0606*** 0.0540*** 0.0547*** 0.0527*** 0.0563*** 0.0515*** 0.2191*** 0.1231***  
[<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] 
FFO per share 0.0242*** 0.0145*** 0.0145*** 0.0145*** 0.0143*** 0.0044 −0.0681* −0.0247 
 
[<0.0001] [0.000] [0.00] [0.000] [0.000] [0.693] [0.080] [0.32] 
Preferred stock 0.0100*** 0.0090** 0.0089** 0.0084** 0.0096** 0.0104** −0.0467* 0.0032  
[0.009] [0.033] [0.03] [0.045] [0.021] [0.02] [0.094] [0.568] 
Variable rate debt/total debt 0.0215*** 0.0211*** 0.0213*** 0.0207*** 0.0225*** 0.0232*** 0.0030 0.0043  
[<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [0.89] [0.589] 
Debt due in 1 year/total debt 0.0032 −0.0056 −0.0059 −0.0054 −0.0076 −0.0103 −0.0214 −0.0015  
[0.801] [0.687] [0.671] [0.696] [0.579] [0.470] [0.723] [0.884] 
Debt due in 2–3 year/total debt 0.0136 0.0190* 0.0190* 0.0187* 0.0197* 0.0172 0.0361 0.0016  
[0.159] [0.064] [0.064] [0.069] [0.052] [0.105] [0.447] [0.8] 
Ln(board size) 
 
−0.0031 −0.0024 −0.0025 −0.0038 −0.0039 0.0318 −0.0282**   
[0.608] [0.686] [0.675] [0.519] [0.549] [0.197] [0.014] 
Board independence 
 
−0.0266*** −0.0263*** −0.0264*** −0.0256*** −0.0231*** 0.0014 −0.0370***   
[<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [<0.0001] [0.000] [0.959] [0.000] 
REIT types Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num of obs 674 500 500 500 500 434 63 106 
Adj R-Sq 0.3434 0.3870 0.3906 0.3842 0.4022 0.3653 0.8110 0.8307 
 
  
The results in Table 7 suggest that, absent any conditioning on the pre-crisis leverage, different measures of 
excess board activity are negatively associated with Change in Leverage post-crisis. In terms of economic 
significance, for example, a one-standard-deviation change in Abnormal Board Meetings is associated with 0.7% 
change in post-crisis leverage (Model 2) while a one-standard-deviation change in Experience-weighted 
Abnormal Board Meetings is associated with 0.1% change in post-crisis leverage (Model 3). When we separate 
director experience into real estate and finance experience, we find that FIN Experience-weighted Abnormal 
Board Meetings is negatively associated with Change in Leverage post-crisis (Model 5). However, there is no 
significant association between RE Experience-weighted Abnormal Board Meetings and Change in Leverage post-
crisis (Model 4). These findings are consistent with the argument that financial experience (rather than the real 
estate experience) is more relevant in making capital structure decisions during our sample period. We also find 
that firms whose return is less than cost of debt (i.e. negative leverage in 2006) lower their leverage post-crisis 
(Model 6). 
In terms of control variables, we find that larger firms, firms with higher Tobin's Q and higher Cash/Total Assets 
tends to lower their leverage post-crisis (Models 1–5). For example, one standard deviation increase in ln(Total 
Assets), Firm Q, or Cash/Total Assets in associated with 1–3% decrease in leverage after the financial crisis 
(Model 1). In addition, prior year's leverage is positively associated with the change in leverage. A one-standard-
deviation change in the prior year's leverage is associated with 5–6% increase in the change in post-crisis 
leverage (Models 1–5). 
When we divide our sample into firms with high and low pre-crisis leverage, we find that excess board activity as 
measured by FIN Experience-weighted Abnormal Board Meetings is negatively associated with the change in 
leverage post-crisis for both samples but more so among high levered firms. In particular, a one-standard-
deviation change in FIN Experience-weighted Abnormal Board Meetings is associated with a 0.5% change in 
post-crisis leverage for high levered firms (Model 6) and 0.1% for low levered firms (Model 7). Interestingly, 
negative leverage is still negatively associated with decreasing leverage, but only for the sample of low levered 
firms. Overall, the results in Table 7 are consistent with the findings in Table 6 and with the hypothesis that post-
crisis, firms with high pre-crisis leverage and more active boards lower their leverage. The potential explanation 
is that active boards learn from their experience during the crisis and adjust to a more conservative capital 
structure. 
Finally, we examine the association between board activity, leverage, and firm performance after the financial 
crisis. Our dependent variable is the cumulative stock return from March 2009 to December 2016 (Cumulative 
Return 2009–2016). In Table 8, Model 1 is similar to Sun et al.'s (2015) in order to facilitate a comparison of 
results (although their sample ends in 2011). In Models 2 and 3, we add Abnormal Board 
Meetings and Experience-weighted Abnormal Board Meetings during the financial crisis, respectively. In Model 4 
we incorporate board size and board independence and in Model 5 we include an indicator (S&L Crisis Exp.) that 
takes a value of one if the board has at least on director whose managerial experience include the Savings and 
Loans crisis in the early 1980s. Lastly, we include an indicator variable High Leverage and the interaction of High 
Leverage with Experience-weighted Abnormal Board Meetings during the financial crisis (Model 6). Again, except 
for board activity which is measured during the financial crisis, all other explanatory variables are measured at 
the end of 2006, the pre-crisis level. 
  
Table 8. Board activity, leverage and firm performance post-crisis. 
 
This table reports the association between board activity, leverage and firm performance after the financial crisis. The dependent variable is 
cumulative monthly stock returns between March 2009 and December 2016 (Cumulative Return 2009–2016). Market Leverage is defined as the 
ratio of total debt (the book value of debt due in one year plus long-term debt) to market value of the firm (total debt plus book value of 
preferred stock plus market capitalization). Abnormal Board Meetings during the financial crisis is measured as the difference between the 
number of board meetings during 2007 and 2008 and the average number of board meetings from 2003 to 2006 (i.e. the pre-crisis 
period). Exp. Weighted Abnormal Board Meetings is calculated as the product of FIN&RE Experience and Abnormal Board Meetings. S&L Crisis 
Exp. is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one director has managerial experience in real estate or finance in the 
1980s. High Leverage is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm's market leverage is in the top quartile, and zero otherwise 
(see Appendix 2 for other variable definitions). Explanatory variables are measured at the end of 2006 and are standardized at the mean and 
have unit variance. P-values are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed 
tests. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 4.8297*** 4.3256*** 4.3955*** 4.3890*** 4.7959*** 4.7711***  
[0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] 
Market leverage 0.9897 0.6887 0.6686 0.7998 0.8260 
 
 
[0.158] [0.328] [0.344] [0.268] [0.255] 
 
Ab. board meetings during crisis 
 
0.7935* 
    
  
[0.054] 
    
Exp. weighted ab. board Meetings during crisis 
  
0.0885* 0.1015** 0.1067** 0.1777***    
[0.057] [0.04] [0.034] [0.009] 
S&L crisis exp. 
    
−0.7033 −0.8007      
[0.422] [0.371] 
High leverage 
     
0.9696       
[0.363] 
High leverage* exp. Weighted ab. board meetings 
     
−0.1480       
[0.130] 
Ln(total assets) 0.5298 0.3779 0.3385 0.0065 0.1306 0.2824  
[0.344] [0.497] [0.546] [0.991] [0.836] [0.656] 
Firm Q −0.404 −0.521 −0.5826 −0.4821 −0.3259 −0.6688  
[0.590] [0.482] [0.434] [0.530] [0.681] [0.334] 
FFO per share −0.935** −0.974*** −0.9785*** −1.0703*** −0.9975*** −1.0296***  
[0.01] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.008] [0.007] 
Cash/total assets 0.4974 0.3189 0.3859 0.5618 0.5926 0.2885  
[0.552] [0.701] [0.642] [0.512] [0.491] [0.73] 
Variable rate debt/total debt 0.4318 0.3857 0.3843 0.5166 0.5012 0.5311  
[0.253] [0.301] [0.303] [0.18] [0.19] [0.179] 
Debt due in 1 year/total debt 1.18 0.9713 1.1920 0.7583 0.7285 1.1198  
[0.608] [0.669] [0.600] [0.74] [0.752] [0.630] 
Debt due in 2–3 year/total debt −1.167 −1.146 −1.1628 −1.0912 −0.9474 −0.7746  
[0.192] [0.197] [0.1] [0.226] [0.303] [0.400] 
Ln(board size) 
   
0.5588 0.6383 0.6040     
[0.20] [0.161] [0.186] 
Board independence 
   
0.2048 0.2366 0.4458     
[0.645] [0.597] [0.326] 
REIT types Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num of obs 93 93 93 92 91 91 
R-square 0.3527 0.3854 0.3848 0.4055 0.4109 0.4278 
 
  
Across all models, we find that post-crisis, leverage is no longer negatively associated with stock returns.6 More 
importantly, we find that excess board activity during the financial crisis is positively associated with stock 
returns post-crisis. For example, in Model 2, a one-standard-deviation increase in abnormal board meetings 
during the financial crisis is associated with an increase in cumulative stock return of approximately 80% post-
crisis (or 8.7% annually), comparable to Sun et al. (2015).7 However, neither the coefficient of the indicator 
capturing experience during the 1980s crisis, high leverage, nor the interaction term with abnormal meetings is 
significantly associated with post-crisis returns. Overall, the results in Table 8 provide some support for the 
hypothesis that firms with more active boards have higher returns post-crisis. This finding is also consistent with 
the finding of Vafaes (1999) that firm performance improves following years of abnormal board activity. 
6. Conclusion 
Capital structure, corporate governance, and how they are linked to each other and to firm performance have 
been studied extensively. While capital structure theory predicts a positive association between leverage and 
firm performance, the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Similarly, there is conflicting evidence on the 
link between corporate boards, arguably the most important component of corporate governance, and firm 
performance. In this paper, we re-examine the negative association between leverage and stock 
returns reported in the more recent literature. In doing so we also consider the potential for board activity to 
influence this link. Specifically, we focus on a sample of REITs from 2003 to 2016. REITs provide an ideal setting 
because of their high leverage and the volatility that the industry experienced during the financial crisis. 
We find that, during the financial crisis, board activity at REITs increased, especially among firms with high 
leverage. This finding is consistent with directors increasing their monitoring and advising according to the firm's 
demand for such input from the board. Further, we show that after controlling for potential endogeneity 
concerns, board activity helps mitigate the previously reported negative effect of leverage on returns during the 
financial crisis. Post-crisis, we find evidence that firms with more active boards adjust their leverage. REITs with 
high pre-crisis leverage firms reduce their leverage, while those with low pre-crisis leverage increase their debt. 
This finding is consistent with boards learning from their experience during the financial crisis and adjusting the 
firm's capital structure. Finally, we find some evidence suggesting that post-crisis, firms with more active boards 
have better returns. This is consistent with prior evidence suggesting that firm performance improves following 
years of abnormal board activity. Our findings are robust to using different measures of activity that take into 
account director experience in real estate and finance. 
Our paper contributes to the capital structure literature by providing insights to the “puzzling” negative 
association between leverage and firm performance. In addition, we add to the literature on corporate boards 
by providing evidence on how boards can add value. Finally, we add to the literature on corporate governance in 
REITs by examining a different dimension of corporate boards, board activity, which has been shown to be 
informative for non-REITs firms. 
Appendix 1. Data construction 
Dataset Firms Firm-year 
obs 
Ziman REIT database between 2003 and 2016 275 
 
Merge with Compustat 246 1811 
Merge with CRSP 243 1755 
Merge with MyLogIQ, MorningStar, and hand-collected data from proxy statements, 
Bloomberg and Linkedin 
222 1701 
2006 sub-sample 137 
 





Board meetings The number of board meetings during the fiscal year. 
Committee 
meetings 
The aggregate number of Audit, Compensation and Nominating/Governance 
committee meetings during the fiscal year. 
Abnormal board 
meetings 
The difference between the number of board meetings in a particular year during or 
post-crisis periods and the average number of board meetings pre-crisis period (from 
2003 to 2006). 
Abnormal 
committee meetings 
The difference between the number of committee meetings in a particular year during 
or post-crisis periods and the corresponding average number of committee meetings 
pre-crisis period (from 2003 to 2006). 
FIN experience The average across the whole board of the number of years of managerial experience 
in finance. 
RE experience The average across the whole board of the number of years of managerial experience 
in real estate. 
FIN & RE experience The average across the whole board of the number of years of managerial experience 
in finance or real estate. 
Exp. weighted ab. 
board meetings 
The product of Abnormal Board Meetings and FIN & RE Experience. 
FIN exp. weighted 
ab. board meetings 
The product of Abnormal Board Meetings and FIN Experience. 
RE exp. weighted ab. 
board meetings 
The product of Abnormal Board Meetings and RE Experience. 
S&L crisis exp. An indicator variable that takes a value of one if at least one director has managerial 
experience in real estate or finance in the 1980s. 
Board size The total number of directors on the board. 
Board independence The proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Firm characteristics  
Cumulative return 
2007–2009 
Cumulative monthly rates of return from January 2007 to February 2009. 
Cumulative return 
2009–2016 
Cumulative monthly rates of return from March 2009 to December 2016. 
Market leverage The ratio of total debt (the book value of debt due in one year plus long-term debt) to 
the market value of the firm (total debt plus book value of preferred stock plus market 
capitalization). 
High leverage An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm's market leverage is in the 
top quartile, and zero otherwise. 
Firm Q The firm's Tobin's Q, calculated as the market value of equity plus total assets minus 
the book value of common equity, divided by the book value of assets. 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets. 
FFO per share Funds from operations per share. 
Cash/total assets The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. 
Preferred stock The ratio of book value of preferred stock to the market value of the firm (total debt 
plus book value of preferred stock plus market capitalization). 
Variable rate 
debt/total debt 
The ratio of variable interest rate debt to total debt. 
Debt due in 
1 year/total debt 
The ratio of debt due in one year to total debt. 
Debt due in 2–
3 year/total debt 
The ratio of debt due in two or three years to total debt. 
Negative leverage An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the firm's return calculated as EBITA/ 
(Equity Market Capitalization + Book Value of Debt) is less than its weighted average 
cost of debt. 
REIT types The set of indicator variables that take value of one if the REIT is classified as 
Lodging/Resorts, Residential, Industrial/Office, Retail, Diversified, Healthcare, Self-
Storage, Mortgage, and Mortgage Back Securities, respectively. Others is the base 
category. 
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1https://www.reit.com/data-research/reit-indexes/monthly-index-values-returns. 
2Our weighted measures of director activity are similar in spirit to those in Brick and Chidambaran (2010) except 
that they weight meetings by the proportion of independent directors on the board. Explanations for 
the difference are threefold (i) their focus is on board monitoring which is arguably is affected by the 
level of director independence while our focus is on director functions more generally (i.e. both 
monitoring and advising), (ii) we include board independence as a control variable, and (iii) they do not 
consider measures of director expertise. 
3The Ziman REIT database on CRSP includes the following property types: Lodging/Resorts, Residential, 
Industrial/Office, Retail, Diversified, Healthcare, Self-Storage, Mortgage, Mortgage Back Securities, and 
Others. 
4The number of monitoring committee meetings is lower than reported in Nguyen (2014) as her sample 
comprises S&P 1500 firms and meetings for the Audit, Compensation, Nomination/Governance, and all 
other monitoring committees. 
5 
As robustness tests, we also use the FIN Exp weighted-, RE Exp weighted-, and non-weighted abnormal board 
activity during the financial crisis (one at a time) and the results (not tabulated) are similar. 
6Sun et al. (2015) only find a marginally significant positive association between leverage and returns in two out 
of seven specifications. 
7Note that from January 2007 to February 2009, NAREIT All REIT index had dropped >70% and from February 
2009 to December 2016, it had bounced up by approximately 220% (https://www.reit.com/data-
research/reit-indexes/monthly-index-values-returns). 
 
